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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the effects of political instability on inflation in Pakistan. Applying the 
Generalized Method of Moments and using data from 1951-2007, we examine this link in two 
different models. The results of the ‘monetary’ model suggest that the effects of monetary 
determinants are rather marginal and that they depend upon the political environment of Pakistan. 
The ‘nonmonetary’ model’s findings explicitly establish a positive association between measures 
of political instability and inflation. This is further confirmed on analyses based on interactive 
dummies that reveal political instability significantly leading to high (above average) inflation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In its sixty years of history, Pakistan has had a great deal of political instability ranging from 
dismissals, assassinations, coups, or cabinet changes. There could be little doubt then that this 
instability did not hamper Pakistan’s policy formulation, implementation, or effectiveness such as 
attempts at macroeconomic stabilization. Political instability does not provide much room for the 
implementation or continuation of consistent or coherent policies. This greatly undermines the 
competence of a government and diminishes its resilience to accommodate shocks that eventually 
results in macroeconomic disequilibrium such as inflation. 
 
The conventional view on political instability however, similar to weak-form Fiscal Theory of 
Price Level (FTPL) determination, is that it leads to high inflation due to governments’ excessive 
reliance on seigneiorage. A logical indication of this mechanism, a high correlation between 
money and inflation, is indeed true for very high (hyper) inflation countries. But, this relationship 
might not hold for low or moderately high inflation countries like Pakistan. In such cases the 
predictions of strong-form FTPL, in which price level is determined irrespective of money 
growth, are more relevant. This is especially more pertinent when it is analyzed with some of the 
predictions of the theories of Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policy (PEMP) literature that 
actually contextualize the price level determination without money growth. 
 
The empirical literature examining the inflation determinants in Pakistan does not consider 
political instability as a possible determinant in their models.1 Out of about two dozen studies, 
more than half find inflation as a monetary phenomenon. These studies however do not take into 
account the problem of simultaneity, generally associated with a standard Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) method, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent results. 
 
Applying the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and using data from 1951-2007, we 
investigate the effects of political instability on inflation in Pakistan in two different models. Our 
findings of the first, ‘monetary’, model imply that the effects of monetary determinants are rather 
marginal and that this effect crucially depends upon the political environment of Pakistan. The 
results of the second, ‘nonmonetary’, model explicitly establish the measures of political 
                                                            
1 Even on an international level studies on this are few; most notably, Aisen and Veiga (2006), Cukeirman et al. (1992), 
Edwards and Tabellini (1991), and Paldam (1987). With disagreement in reasoning on as to how political instability 
leads to inflation and in some fine interpretation of results, this study follows Aisen and Veiga (2006). 
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instability as important determinants of inflation in Pakistan. Further analyses based on 
interactive dummies reveal that political instability leads to above average inflation, more than 
others such as oil price. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical link between political 
instability and inflation with special emphasis on a country like Pakistan. Section 2 outlines the 
empirical strategy by describing the models and data. Section 3 presents and discusses the results 
of the estimated models. Concluding remarks follow in Section 4. 
 
2. How Political Instability Leads to Inflation? 
 
To show the link between political instability and inflation, we use a combination of the 
predictions of the FTPL determination and the PEMP literature. Following Carlstrom and Fuerst 
(1999) and (2000), the FTPL posits that price level and hence inflation is a result of the budgetary 
policies of the fiscal authorities. This is argued in two versions of weak-form FTPL and strong-
form FTPL.2 The weak version akin to the famous monetarists’ dictum, “inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon,” argues that inflation is produced by excessive money 
growth dictated by the fiscal authorities and not the central bank. Thus, the underlying 
assumption here is the dominance of fiscal authorities in money creation. Whereas, the incentive 
for money creation is the revenue generation by printing money; that is, through seignorage. 
 
Skeptics however argue that seignorage in reality does not account for as much of an amount of 
revenue collection so as to validate the aforementioned fiscal dominance assumption. This 
critique paves the way for the possibility of the dual dominance of both the fiscal and monetary 
authorities and thus the strong-form FTPL. The strong-form argues that fiscal policy 
independently affects the price level and hence the inflation rate; independent of the changes in 
money growth and dependent on the changes in government debt or budget deficit. 
 
To illustrate this point, let us assume the standard intertemporal fiscal budget balance of the type 
00g P/B)m(SD =+ . Where, D  is the present value of the future budget surplus (if negative then 
deficit), )m(S g  is the seignorage as the function of money growth )m( g , 0B  is the value of 
government debt, and 0P  is the nominal price level. Now considering that there is constant money 
                                                            
2 See, also Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) and Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) for a detailed review of the FTPL. 
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growth )1m( g =  then the above budget equation would yield D/BP 00 = . This implies, in this 
partial equilibrium setup, that for any future increase in budget surplus prices must fall down and 
for any future decrease in budget surplus (that is, increase in deficit) prices must rise to restore 
balance in the fiscal budget. Similarly, increase in the value of government debt would also raise 
price level and vice versa. 
 
What would cause the budget deficit and government debt to increase or persist that actually 
leads to higher inflation rate in this set up? Two predictions from PEMP literature are relevant in 
this context. The first is the concept of ‘political instability and deficit bias’ as modeled by 
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and the other is known as the ‘war of attrition’ as modeled by 
Alesina and Drazen (1991). 
 
The theory of ‘political instability and deficit bias’ argues that alternating governments are either 
uncertain of each others’ preferences or they disagree over the composition of public spending 
that gives rise to excessively high budget deficits. Because it is in the interest of an incumbent 
policy maker to run high budget deficit so as to maximize the spending of its own preference and 
thereby limiting the spending of its successor’s preference. This strategic interaction reflects 
adversely on society’s intertemporal choices and results into suboptimal outcomes. Typically, the 
deficit bias is stronger the unstable is the political system or the greater is the likelihood of a 
government change. 
 
Yet another channel of persistence or increase in deficit is the phenomenon of ‘war of attrition’ 
between conflicting political groups. A typical example to explain this is an unsustainable budget 
deficit. Even though it would be efficient to close down the deficit, a political agreement over this 
is often not found. This delay in fiscal stabilization may last until it becomes extremely costly for 
everybody. The reason in this delay has to do with asymmetric information among key political 
figures; that is, who bears the cost of stabilization?3 Thus, the higher the number of political 
parties in a legislative council the higher the likelihood of conflict the harder to reach agreements 
and the more the persistence or increase in fiscal deficit. 
 
                                                            
3 A focused explanation of this phenomenon through a hypothetical example goes as follows. Consider a coalition 
government in office that comprises political parties A and B. The senior partner (party A) wishes to minimize a 
seemingly unsustainable budget deficit through the abandonment of generous pension-related expenditures. Party B, 
however, does not agree to this, as it is afraid to lose its substantial vote-bank that enjoys the privileges stemming from 
pension-related expenditures of the government. Thus, party A and party B is locked in a war of attrition and the delay 
in this stabilization may carry adverse economic consequences. 
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While both the theories of ‘war of attrition’ and ‘political instability and deficit bias’ focus on 
budget deficit, the basic idea of these theories can nonetheless be applied to any other variable 
such as public investment or government debt. In the absence of any binding fiscal rule and given 
the aforementioned political economy predictions the public investments are bound to swell 
through increase in government debt thus leading to inflation. More importantly, political 
instability undermines the effectiveness of a government in implementing consistent or coherent 
policies and weakens the state’s hold on the management of economy. The bureaucracy, on the 
other hand, greatly benefits from this situation and remains unaccountable to the state organs. All 
this provides an accommodating framework for the promotion of corruption culture resulting in 
severe distortions. Apart from weakening the resilience of the economy in the case of exogenous 
shocks such as oil price, it also results in endogenous supply shocks such as food price hikes (for 
example, due to hoarding). 
 
Relevance to Pakistan 
 
Previous studies linking political instability to inflation have however reasoned otherwise; closer 
to the weak-form FTPL. Most notably, Cukierman et al. (1992) and more recently Aisen and 
Veiga (2006) argue that economies with political instability and weak institutions do not have 
efficient tax system that increases their reliance on seigniorage. Therefore, to meet the demand 
for public expenditures they end up printing excessive money that eventually leads to inflation. 
We however argue that this line of reasoning might be true for very high (hyper) inflation 
countries but not for low or moderately high inflation countries.4 
 
Our argument is based on two studies by Moroney (2002) and DeGrauwe and Polan (2005) that 
test the one-on-one relationship between money and inflation in multi-country investigations. The 
former study separates countries into ‘high-money-growth and high-inflation’ and ‘low-money-
growth and low-inflation’ categories. The first category is characterized by money growth 
exceeding real GDP growth by at least 15 percent and for the second category exceeding by less 
than 6 percent. He finds that one-on-one relationship is strongly supported in the first category 
and does not carry the same support in the second category. Similarly, the latter study confirms 
this result by separating countries into four categories characterized by annual average money 
(M1 and M2) growth rates of less than 15, 20, 30, and 100 percents. The one-on-one relationship  
 
                                                            
4 Aisen and Veiga (2006) in their empirical analysis define high inflation as a rate equal to or greater than 50 percent. 
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holds in the last two categories; the coefficients for less than 20 percent category are 0.79 and 
0.88 for M1 and M2; and for the first category the coefficients are 0.22 (M1) and 0.25 (M2).5 
 
In Pakistan average annual inflation and money growth (M2 growth) remained 6.99 percent and 
13.64 percent during 1951-2007. M2 growth to real GDP growth over the same time has 
remained at 3.04 percent. By Moroney and De Grauwe and Polan standards, Pakistan can be 
categorized into ‘low-money-growth and low-inflation’ countries. 
 
Also note that the correlation coefficient, as reflected in Figure 1, between CPI inflation and M2 
growth during 1951-2007 has remained 20.1 percent. Therefore, the seigniorage factor as argued 
in the weak-form FTPL cannot be applied to a country like Pakistan; the combination of the 
predictions of the strong-form FTPL determination and PEMP literature are more relevant. 
 
3. The Empirical Strategy and Data 
 
Based on our discussion in the preceding section, without claiming to model inflation on some 
new lines of research, we propose two different estimable models. The first model is the summary 
of the empirical evidence already available on Pakistan economy and the second model stems 
from the ‘nonmonetary’ determinants of inflation literature. Furthermore, we use GMM 
estimation technique to tackle the limitations, such as simultaneity, of a standard OLS method.6 
 
                                                            
5 This argument is reproduced from Omer and Saqib (2008). 
6 See, for detailed discussion on GMM, Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond 
(1998); see, also Wooldridge (2001) on the applications of GMM estimation. 
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3.1. The Models 
 
In the first, monetary model, we estimate inflation on a host of explanatory variables stemming 
from the results of the empirical studies on Pakistan. Generally, as given in Appendix A, these 
studies have overwhelmingly termed inflation experience in Pakistan as a monetary phenomenon. 
Therefore, based on these predictions our monetary model takes the following form: 
 
tti1t0t M ε+β+πα=π −          (1) 
 
tπ  is inflation rate, 1t−π  is one period lagged rate of inflation as a proxy to inflation inertia. iβ ’s 
are the parameters showing incremental impact of explanatory variables of vector tM . Whereas, 
vector tM  includes the most probable monetary determinants such as money supply, credit to 
private sector, or fiscal balance. tε  represents the error term. 
 
Note however that OLS estimates of Equation (1) would yield inconsistent estimates as there 
could be a problem of simultaneity.7 To tackle this we apply the system-GMM methodology, 
wherein taking political instability as strong instrument(s). If the resulting estimates turn out to be 
significant as per the standard diagnostics then this result explicitly implies one important point: 
without political instability a monetary model as Equation (1) does not provide an adequate 
explanation of inflation. Furthermore, a result of this kind also paves the way for nonmonetary 
determinants of inflation model. 
 
This approach attempts to model inflation by focusing exclusively on the nonmonetary or 
‘deeper’ determinants of inflation. The motivation for this approach can be understood by 
considering the case of strong-form FTPL described above. In effect, government’s motivation, 
capacity, or effectiveness vis-à-vis management of the economy is essentially the deeper 
determinants of inflation.8 Thus, applying the GMM methodology the nonmonetary determinants 
of inflation model in general can be given as follows: 
 
tt2t11t0t PIW ε+β+β+πα=π −         (2) 
                                                            
7 For example, Omer and Saqib (2008) argue that money (M2) is endogenous in Pakistan. 
8 As an example, Cottarelli et al. (1998) argue that while inflation could be a monetary phenomenon it is more 
interesting to know why governments allow monetary expansion in the first place that actually cause inflation. See, also 
Aisen and Veiga (2006) and Hammermann (2007). The former explains the world wide diversity in inflation 
experiences by also incorporating political instability and the latter focuses on the case of Romania. 
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tW  is strictly exogenous covariate vector of variables including a set of nonmonetary 
determinants, tPI  is a vector of political instability measures, and tε  is the error term. We 
estimate Equation (2) as a baseline model and estimate it again with a set of interactive variables 
to capture the determinants of high (above average) inflation in Pakistan. 
 
3.2. The Data 
 
We use annual time series data for the years 1951 to 2007. The data we use broadly covers the 
economic and political environment of Pakistan. Unless mentioned otherwise, data source is the 
State Bank of Pakistan and the Federal Bureau of Statistics of Pakistan. Our dependant variable is 
Inflation as the yearly growth rate of Consumer Price Index. To account for the historical impact 
of inflation, inflation inertia, as one of the explanatory variables we use one period lagged 
inflation, (Inflation)t-1. For our monetary model of Equation (1), we use three variables: M2 
(yearly growth rate of the broad money supply); Credit (yearly growth rate of credit to the 
private sector); and Fiscal balance (yearly growth rate of budget deficit). 
 
The estimation of nonmonetary determinants model includes two types of variables. The first type 
accounts for a government’s capacity to control inflation: Agriculture output (percent of 
agriculture output to GDP) and Trade share (sum of trade volume to GDP; proxy for degree of 
openness). The second type accounts for government’s performance and exogenous shocks: GDP 
per capita (yearly growth rate of real GDP per capita) and Oil price (yearly growth rate of U.K. 
Brent; dollars per barrel; International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund). 
 
For data on political instability, we use three different variables that indicate the political 
environment of Pakistan. First, we use Polity IV dataset of the Polity IV Project, Center for 
Global Policy, George Mason University and call it as Polity. In accordance with its lexicon 
meaning Polity does represent “a particular form or a system of government”, its generators 
define it on the bases of regime legitimacy. Broadly, three norms concerning executive are 
identified: recruitment, constraints, and political competition. They are then given scale weights 
under Democratic and Autocratic regimes’ characteristics. Interaction of these two then yields 
Polity that ranges from -10 (purely Autocratic) to +10 (purely Democratic). Increase in Polity 
then signifies a more democratic polity and decrease for a more autocratic one. 
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The second variable for political instability is the Government crises of the Cross National Time 
Series Data Archive. It accounts for the number of situations in a given year that threaten to 
undermine a current regime. Our third variable, Cabinet changes, is also from the Cross 
National Time Series Data Archive. It represents the number of changes in and of government. 
Specifically, it gives the number of times in a year a chief executive and/or 50 percent of cabinet 
is replaced with new minister(s). Increase in both the Government crises and Cabinet changes 
indicate increase in political instability. 
 
Significance of Political Instability Variables to Pakistan 
 
With reference to Pakistan’s experience Polity actually never reaches to any of its extreme values 
of either +10 or -10. Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics of Polity for some select countries. As 
evident, for most politically stable and democratic countries, the mean, median, maximum, and 
minimum values are all +10 with 0 standard deviations. But, for Pakistan and Brazil this is not the 
case; it is suffice to assume a high degree of political regime switching as the standard deviations 
for both these countries stands at very high values of 6.07 and 6.54. 
 
Similarly, Pakistan records high values in both the Government crises and Cabinet changes. 
Followed only by Brazil and India, the standard deviation and mean values for Pakistan are at 
0.85 and 0.60 for Government crises and 0.79 and 0.68 for Cabinet changes. 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Political Instability Variables for Select Countries 
 U.S.A.a/ UKa/ Singaporea/ Indiaa/ Pakistanb/ Brazila/ 
Polity 
Mean 10 10 -1.10 8.57 1.31 1.39 
Median 10 10 -2 9 1 5 
Maximum 10 10 7 9 8 8 
Minimum 10 10 -2 7 -7 -9 
Std. Dev. 0 0 2.73 0.57 6.07 6.54 
Government Crises 
Mean 0.04 0.26 0 0.47 0.60 0.46 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 1 3 0 2 3 3 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Std. Dev. 0.20 0.63 0 0.65 0.85 0.81 
Cabinet Changes 
Mean 0.24 0.38 0.06 0.52 0.68 0.44 
Median 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 4 2 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Std. Dev. 0.43 0.49 0.24 0.50 0.79 0.54 
a/ 1951-2002; b/ 1951-2007 
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Table 2. Polity and the Number of Government Crises and Cabinet Changes 
 Polity Government Crises Cabinet Changes 
1951-1957 4.1 10 5 
1958-1972 -1.6 9 5 
1973-1977 2.5 1 2 
1978-1988 -5.3 0 9 
1989-1999 7.2 10 12 
2000-2007 -4.2 12 3 
 
 
This degree of political instability and uncertainty as in the aforementioned variables for Pakistan 
is greatly reflected in the frequent changes in the heads of state and prime ministers. As presented 
in Appendix B, in its sixty years history Pakistan has had a fairly large number of executive 
changes with forty-one heads of state and prime ministers; notably, there have been twenty-five 
prime ministers to this date. Apart from this, there are two important points to note in the same 
table. First, a large majority of the Pakistani executives had rather short stints in the office. 
Second, the tenures of many did not end as a result of some routine change, such as elections; for 
a majority, the exit has been unceremonious such as dismissals. 
 
A noteworthy aspect of political instability in Pakistan is that Government crises and Cabinet 
changes are associated more with democratic regimes than the autocratic ones. As presented in 
Table 2, the Polity index with positive values, signifying the regimes with more democratic 
characteristics, shows more instability than the Polity with negative values. 
 
Although Pakistan does not have a history of runaway inflation, it has experienced some episodes 
of high inflation rates. In fifty-seven years from 1951 to 2007, the inflation remained in double-
digit in fourteen years and some of those years coincide with oil price shocks. Taking the sample 
average of 6.99 percent as a benchmark of high inflation then it was in twenty-six years that 
inflation was recorded more than this average; most notably from 1973 to 1982, 1991 to 1998, 
and more recently from 2005 to 2007. All these years coincide more with Polity with positive 
values; that is more with Government crises and Cabinet changes. 
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Figure 2. Polity and Monthly CPI Variability, 1958-2007
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Analyzing therefore Polity with monthly CPI variability reveals interesting pattern.9 As shown in 
Figure 2, the trend line of the scatter plot between Polity and monthly CPI variability is upward 
sloping. This signifies that the more the democratic a regime in Pakistan, the higher the 
variability in CPI. In other words, Government crises and Cabinet changes are associated with an 
upward CPI variability. 
 
4. The Results 
 
Estimation results for the monetary model as outlined in Section 3 are given in Table 3. Standard 
diagnostics such as J-statistics and the standard errors of all the coefficients highlight that 
technically it is an acceptable regression. Note however that here we have treated Government 
crises and Cabinet changes as instruments (as both these variables can be affected by inflation); 
since we assume that like Polity both these indicators are exogenous. For example, Cabinet 
changes, as highlighted in Appendix B, have hardly taken place as a result of some economic 
bottlenecks such as price hike. Similarly, if we examine Government crises index (not reported 
here) for periods that immediately follow high inflationary episodes, such as the early 1970s, we 
mostly find the index with zero values. 
 
Thus the estimates of our monetary model verify that political environment is the exogenous 
determinant of inflation. Monetary variables (M2, Credit, and Fiscal balance) nonetheless show a 
positive and significant relationship with inflation as envisaged in the a priori empirical model. 
 
 
Table 3. Monetary Model 
 coefficient std. error 
 
(Inflation)t-1 0.616 0.028 
 
M2 0.072 0.025 
 
Credit 0.027 0.005 
 
Fiscal balance 0.055 0.016 
 
J-statistic 
 
0.252 
 
Notes: System-GMM TIME series estimation for specified model. Sample period: 1951–07. As mentioned in the model description we use 
political environment (polity, government crises, and cabinet changes) as the external determinants of inflation (instrument variables). For 
lagged inflation, their lagged values were used as instruments. 10% significance level at which the null hypothesis is not rejected. Hansen tests 
never reject the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. 
                                                            
9 CPI variability is computed as the monthly CPI changes above average-CPI during each year. 
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The impact of these variables however is very small as compared to those argued by several 
empirical studies on Pakistan (as presented in Appendix A). 
 
In particular, if the sample average inflation is 6.99 percent then one percent increase in M2, 
Credit, and Fiscal balance would raise inflation rate by 0.50, 0.16, and 0.38 percentage points to 
7.49, 7.17, and 7.37 percents respectively. By far the most pronounced result in this estimate is of 
the inflation inertia: a percent increase in lagged inflation would raise sample average inflation 
rate of 6.99 percent by 4.30 percentage point to 11.29 percent. 
 
The superiority of this result over previous studies on Pakistan is further established on two 
grounds: none of the previous studies have addressed the simultaneity problem and none of them 
have used as large a sample as the one used in the current study. Together with this and the 
marginal impact of monetary variables’ findings imply that in the long run inflation might not be 
a monetary phenomenon; even the marginal effects of monetary variables crucially depend upon 
the political environment of Pakistan. This result further paves the way to find out the 
nonmonetary or deeper determinants of inflation in Pakistan. 
 
The results of our second model of nonmonetary determinants of inflation as in Section 3 are 
presented in Table 4. The technical conditions in both specifications of this model, as reflected in 
the standard diagnostics, are acceptable. Including lagged inflation, the lagged values of other 
determinants are used as instruments. Similar to our estimation results in Table 3; all the 
explanatory variables are statistically significant. 
 
The results of Specification I confirm the first-order impact of nonmonetary determinants on 
inflation. As can be seen, relatively the political environment variables carry more sizeable 
impact than that of the economic variables. Among the economic variables the most striking 
result is of the Oil price and of the Trade share. Contrary to the popular perception of oil price 
shocks aggravating inflation, the coefficient in our estimate is rather marginal at 2.4 percent only. 
Similarly, the conventional wisdom that more openness of trade leads to lesser inflation does not 
hold true for Pakistan. The coefficient of Trade share is with positive sign and with a considerable 
impact of about 20.7 percent. 
 
The impact of GDP per capita in reducing inflation is rather pronounced at -26.2 percent; 
whereas, the effects of Agriculture output in reducing inflation is rather small at -1.5 percent.  
13 
 
Table 4. Nonmonetary Determinants Model 
I II  
coefficient std. error coefficient std. error 
 
(Inflation)t-1 
 
0.298 
 
0.047 
 
0.135 
 
0.044 
 
Polity  
 
0.192 
 
0.031 
 
 
 
 
 
Polity*(inflation>average inflation) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.040 
 
0.004 
 
Government crises 
 
0.250 
 
0.138 
 
 
 
 
 
Government crises*(inflation>average inflation) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.715 
 
0.095 
 
Cabinet changes 
 
0.411 
 
0.162 
 
 
 
 
 
Cabinet changes*(inflation>average inflation) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.051 
 
0.017 
 
Oil price 
 
0.024 
 
0.007 
 
 
 
 
 
Oil price*(inflation>average inflation) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
GDP per capita 
 
-0.262 
 
0.059 
 
-0.365 
 
0.058 
 
Agriculture output 
 
-0.015 
 
0.008 
 
0.020 
 
0.011 
 
Trade share 
 
0.207 
 
0.018 
 
0.191 
 
0.021 
 
J-statistic 
 
 
0.254 
 
 
0.265 
 
Note 1: System-GMM TIME series estimation for specified model. Sample period: 1951–07; As done For lagged inflation, their lagged values 
and the lagged values of other determinants were used as instruments. 10% significance level at which the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
Hansen tests never reject the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. 
Note 2: average inflation (1950-2007) = 6.99 percent. 
 
 
Another noteworthy result of this estimate is the coefficient of the lagged inflation that actually 
reduces in size to 29.8 percent from 61.6 percent of the estimate as in Table 3. This signifies the 
reduction in the explanatory power of lagged inflation due to the inclusion of other variables, 
such as those of political environment. 
 
As for the effects of political instability are concerned, they confirm their sizably increasing 
effects on inflation. With every increase in Government crises and an additional change in 
Cabinet, inflation increases by 25 and 41.1 percents. Clearly, Cabinet changes have by far the 
largest contribution towards inflation acceleration in this set up. Perhaps, the most intriguing 
result is the positive sign associated with the Polity scale; that is, the more the Pakistan moves 
towards the democratic form of government the more inflation increases. 
 
This is in contrast to what a conventional understanding would argue; since a democratic form of 
government ensures economic freedom and a systematic way of governance. While we agree with 
this, we nonetheless argue that this might not hold for a country like Pakistan that exhibits a 
unique characteristic in this respect. In its sixty years history, the maximum number of 
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Government crises and Cabinet changes has taken place during the democratic regimes of 1951-
1958, 1985-1999, and 2003-2007 (Table 2). This is also evident in Appendix B: during these 
periods there have been twenty-one Prime Ministers out of a total of twenty-five. Indeed, with 
this degree of instability under democratic regimes, a positive association of Polity with inflation 
should not be a surprising result. 
 
What Leads to High Inflation in Pakistan? 
 
We now turn to analyze the individual contributions of various determinants towards high 
inflation. We define above sample average inflation rate as ‘high’ inflation in Pakistan, which is 
6.99 percent during 1951-2007. We discard monetary growth as a potential cause of high inflation 
in Pakistan because of our results in Table 1; since the acceptance of M2 growth as a determinant 
of inflation is a possibility because of political environment. 
 
The political environment variables are interacted with dummy variables accounting for inflation 
above the aforementioned sample average; that is, the same inflation rate for the years when it 
was above 6.99 percent, zero otherwise. The results are presented in Specification II of Table 3. 
All the interactive and non-interactive variables are statistically significant with consistent signs. 
Only Agriculture output changes its sign in this Specification; but, its coefficient remains 
marginal. This however is not the case with GDP per capita that apart from retaining its negative 
sign increases in size. Trade share remains nearly the same with its positive sign and size of the 
coefficient. Another noteworthy change in II from I is the reduction in the coefficient of lagged 
inflation from 0.298 percent to 0.135 percent. 
 
The interactive political environment variables while retaining their respective signs change in 
their effects. In particular, Polity and Cabinet changes reduce to 0.040 and 0.051 from 0.192 and 
0.411 percent respectively; whereas, Government crises increase to a sizeable 0.715 from 0.250 
in Specification I. Interestingly, the increase in Oil price variable remains negligible at 0.001. 
Therefore, by far the most distinct result is of Government crises and not of Oil price. 
Specifically, when inflation is above average an additional Government crises increase it by 
0.715. Thus, political instability as in Government crises has the most insightful effect on 
inflation in situations of high (above average) inflation. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Although our finding of a positive association between political instability and inflation are in 
line with that of Aisen and Veiga (2006), we differ with them in reasoning and in some fine 
interpretation of results. We argue that a combination of the predictions of strong-form FTPL and 
theories of PEMP are more relevant in showing a link between political instability and inflation in 
a country like Pakistan. This explicitly comes out in the monetary model estimates that suggest a 
rather marginal impact of monetary determinants on inflation, and that too due to the use of 
political environment as instrument variables. It also implies that inflation might not be a 
monetary phenomenon in Pakistan. Because of the obvious association of polity with higher 
number of Government crises and cabinet changes, the democratic regimes are positively 
associated with inflation in Pakistan. This result particularly highlights the limitations of cross-
country regressions that may hide a fine characteristic of an individual country.10 
 
Moreover, the contribution of our results lies in the fact that no previous study on Pakistan has 
attempted to model inflation determinants within a political instability framework while 
addressing the simultaneity problem as well. This contribution is all the more significant for a 
country that over the years has shown a great deal of political unrest and at the same time has 
never been a very high (hyper) inflation country. Another noteworthy result stems from the 
analysis of interactive dummies that suggest Government crises and not Oil price as more 
significant in explaining high (above average) inflation in Pakistan. 
 
While the costs of inflation are rather well-known, controlling inflation in a country like Pakistan 
is essential in attaining macroeconomic stabilization to eventually address its ultimate objective 
of eliminating poverty. At the same time, low and stable inflation is a crucial societal insurance 
for the marginal segments of Pakistan. Policy makers should therefore recognize the importance 
of a stable political environment for the implementation of consistent and coherent policies. Our 
results suggest that unless political reforms aimed at mitigating Government crises and Cabinet 
changes are not undertaken, inflation stabilization efforts by the technocrats would fail to yield 
long term price stability. 
 
 
                                                            
10 As Aisen and Veiga (2006) in their cross-country regression find a negative association between Polity and inflation, 
confirming an almost universal consensus. 
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Appendix A. Select Literature on Pakistan’s Inflation Determinants 
Study Sample Variables Findings  
 
Omer and Saqib 
(2008) 
 
1975-
2006 
 
Dependant: CPI inflation. Independent: 
M2, real GDP growth 
 
M2 does not hold in one-on-
one relationship with CPI 
inflation 
 
Qayyum (2006) 
 
1960-
2005 
(quarterly) 
 
Dependent: CPI inflation. Independent: 
money, GDP growth, income velocity 
of money 
 
Money is highly significant  
 
Agha and Khan 
(2006) 
 
1973-
2003 
 
CPI inflation, fiscal deficit 
 
Both variables are cointegrated 
 
Chaudhry and 
Choudhary 
(2006) 
 
1972-
2004 
 
Dependent: GDP deflator. 
Independent: M2, real GDP, import 
price 
 
M2 is insignificant 
 
Akbari and 
Rankaduwa 
(2006) 
 
1982-
2004 
 
Dependent: CPI, WPI. Independent: 
exchange rate, foreign price, M2, large 
scale manufacturing index 
 
M2 is inelastic 
 
Khan and 
Schimmelpfennig 
(2006) 
 
1998-
2005 
(monthly) 
 
Dependent: CPI inflation. Independent: 
M2, interest rate, private sector credit, 
large scale manufacturing index, 
nominal effective exchange rate, wheat 
support price 
 
M2 is significant 
 
Kemal (2006) 
 
1975-
2003 
 
CPI inflation, M2, GDP 
 
All variables are cointegrated 
 
Abbas and 
Husain (2006) 
 
1960-
2004 
 
GDP deflator, GNP, M2 
 
Long run relationship between 
GDP deflator and M2  
 
Bokil and 
Schimmelpfennig 
(2005) 
 
1975-
2004 
(annual & 
quarterly) 
 
Dependent: CPI inflation. Independent: 
M2, GDP, large scale manufacturing 
index 
 
M2 is highly significant 
 
Khan and 
Schimmelpfennig 
(2005) 
 
1998-
2005 
(annual & 
monthly) 
 
Dependent: CPI inflation. Independent: 
M2, interest rate, private sector credit, 
GDP, large scale manufacturing index, 
wheat support price 
 
M2 is significant 
 
Hyder and Shah 
(2004) 
 
1988-
2003 
(monthly) 
 
CPI inflation, WPI inflation, nominal 
exchange rate, M2, large scale 
manufacturing index, oil price  
 
Little exchange rate pass 
through to CPI Inflation 
 
Choudhri and 
Khan (2002) 
 
1982-
2001 
 
Dependant: CPI and WPI. 
Independent: nominal exchange rate 
and foreign price index 
 
No exchange rate pass through 
to CPI 
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Appendix A (Cont.) 
Study Sample Variables Findings  
 
Price and Nasim 
(1999) 
 
1974-
1994 
 
Dependant: CPI and exchange rate. 
Independent: M2, world price, GDP, 
forex reserves 
 
PPP and money demand are 
identified through 
cointegration 
 
Ahmad and Ali 
(1999) 
 
1982-
1996 
(quarterly) 
 
Dependent: CPI, exchange rate. 
Independent: M2, GDP, import price, 
world price, forex reserves, exchange 
rate 
 
M2 is significant 
 
Shamsuddin and 
Holmes (1997) 
 
1972-
1994 
(quarterly) 
 
CPI, broad money, real output 
 
No cointegrating relationship  
 
Nasim (1997)  
 
1974-
1994 
 
Dependent: GDP deflator, CPI 
inflation. Independent: M2, foreign 
price, GDP, interest rate 
 
M2 is highly significant 
 
Khan and Qasim 
(1996) 
 
1972-
1995 
 
Dependant: CPI inflation, food 
inflation, non-food inflation. 
Independent: agriculture output, real 
GDP, wheat support price, utility 
price, import price index, interest rate, 
money supply  
 
Money supply, real GDP, 
import price, agriculture 
output, wheat support price, 
utility price are all significant 
 
Chaudhary and 
Ahmad (1996) 
 
1972-
1992 
 
Dependant: CPI inflation. Independent: 
M2, GDP growth, share of service 
sector, public debt, import price 
 
M2 and other are significant 
 
Hasan et al. 
(1995) 
 
1973-
1994 
 
Dependant: Price index of food, 
manufacturing, and raw material. 
Independent: supply shock, money 
supply, procurement price, external 
price, expectations 
 
Money supply insignificant for 
food and weakly significant for 
manufacturing and raw 
material 
 
Dhakal and 
Kandil (1993) 
 
1970-
1987 
(quarterly) 
 
Dependant: CPI inflation. Independent: 
M1, industrial production, interest rate, 
foreign interest rate, import price 
 
M1 is insignificant 
 
Ahmad and Ram 
(1991) 
 
1960-
1988 
 
Dependant: WPI, CPI, GNP deflator. 
Independent: real GNP growth, growth  
rate of  unit value of imports, growth in 
M1/M2, lagged inflation 
 
Real GNP growth, growth rate 
of unit value of imports, 
nominal money growth, lagged 
inflation are significant 
 
Hossain (1990) 
 
1961-
1988 
 
Dependant: inflation. Independent: 
output, money, government debt 
 
Money is highly significant 
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Appendix B. Heads of State and Prime Ministers of Pakistan, 1947 to date 
Governor Generals 
Tenure Incumbent End of Tenure 
 
Aug 14, 1947 to 
Sep 11, 1948 
 
Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali 
Jinnah (Father of the Nation) 
 
Expired in office 
Sep 14, 1948 to 
Oct 19, 1951 
Khawaja Nazimuddin Became Prime Minister; replaced by Malik 
Ghulam Mohammad 
Oct 19, 1951 to 
Aug 07, 1955 
Malik Ghulam Mohammed Forced to resign by Iskandar Mirza 
Aug 07, 1955 to 
Mar 23, 1956 
 
Major General Iskandar Mirza 
 
Became President 
 
Presidents 
Tenure Incumbent End of Tenure 
 
Mar 23, 1956 to 
Oct 27, 1958 
 
Major General Iskandar Mirza 
 
Overthrown by General Mohammad Ayub Khan 
Oct 27, 1958 to 
Mar 25, 1969 
Field Marshal Mohammad 
Ayub Khan 
Resigned following widespread protests 
Mar 25, 1969 to 
Dec 20, 1971 
General Agha Mohammad 
Yahya khan 
Stepped down following the East Pakistan 
debacle. Placed under house arrest. 
Dec 20, 1971 to 
Aug 14, 1973 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Became Prime Minister after promulgation of the 
1973 constitution. 
Aug 14, 1973 to 
Sep 16, 1978 
Chaudhry Fazal Illahi Retired after completing his term 
Sep 16, 1978 to 
Aug  17, 1988 
General Mohammad Zia-ul-
Haq 
Perished in an air crash 
Aug 17, 1988 to 
Jul 18, 1993 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan Resigned under pressure after unsuccessfully 
dissolving the Nawaz Sharif government under 
Article 58(2)/(b) 
Jul 18, 1993 to 
Nov 14, 1993 
Wasim Sajjad Vacated office following Farooq Leghari’s 
election as president. 
Nov 14, 1993 to 
Dec 2, 1997 
Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan 
Leghari 
Forced to resign by Nawaz Sharif 
Dec 2, 1997 to 
Jan 1, 1998 
Wasim Sajjad Caretaker term ended 
Jan 1, 1998 to 
Jun 20, 2001 
Justice (Ret.) Rafique Tarrar Forced to resign through Executive decree. 
Jun 20, 2001 to 
date 
 
General Parvez Musharraf 
 
Relinquished office of Chief Executive which he 
held from October 14, 1999 to June 20, 2001, to 
assume office of President 
 
Prime Ministers 
Tenure Incumbent End of Tenure 
 
Aug 15, 1947 to 
Oct 16, 1951 
 
Khan Liaqat Ali Khan 
 
Assassinated 
Oct 17, 1951 to 
Apr 17, 1953 
Khawaja Nazimuddin Dismissed by Ghulam Mohammad when he 
refused to resign 
Apr 17, 1953 to 
Aug 11, 1955 
 
Mohammad Ali Bogra Dismissed by Iskandar Mirza 
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Appendix B (Cont.) 
Prime Ministers 
Tenure Incumbent End of Tenure 
 
Aug, 1955 to Sep 
12, 1956 
 
Chaudhry Mohammad Ali 
 
Resigned after losing his majority 
Sep 12, 1956 to 
Oct 18, 1957 
Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy Forced to resign by Iskandar Mirza 
Oct 18, 1957 to 
Dec 16, 1957 
I.I. Chundrigar Removed after the republican party 
Withdrew its support 
Dec 16, 1957 to 
Oct 07, 1958 
Malik Feroze khan Noon Removed when Ayub Khan imposed Martial law 
Dec 07, 1971 to 
Dec 20, 1971 
Nurul Amin Removed after the fall of Dhaka 
Aug 14, 1973 to 
July 05, 1977 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Deposed following General Zial-ul-haq’s 
imposition of Martial Law, executed on April 4, 
1979. 
Mar 23, 1985 to 
May 29, 1988 
Muhammad Khan Junejo Dismissed by president Zia-ul-Haq’s imposition 
under artcle 58(2)/(b). 
Dec 02, 1988 to 
Aug 06, 1990 
Benazir Bhutto Dismissed by president Ghulam Ishaq Khan under 
article 58(2)/(b) 
Aug 6, 1990 to 
Nov 6, 1990 
Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi Caretaker capacity Replaced when the Muslim 
League dominated IJI swept the polls 
Nov 6, 1990 to 
Apr 18, 1993 
Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif Dismissed by president Ghulam Ishaq Khan under 
Article 58(2)/(b) 
Apr 18, 1993 to 
May 26, 1993 
Balakh Sher Mazari Ceased to be caretaker Prime Minister following 
Supreme Court verdict 
May 26, 1993 to 
July 8, 1993 
Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif Stepped down under pressure after earlier 
unsuccessful dismissal by president Ghulam Ishaq 
Khan under Article 58(2)/(b). 
July 8, 1993 to 
Oct 19, 1993 
Moin Qureshi Caretaker capacity handed over charge to elected 
government 
Oct 19, 1993 to 
Nov 5, 1996 
Benazir Bhutto Dismissed by president Farooq Leghari under 
Article 58(2)/(b) 
Nov 5, 1996 to 
Feb 17, 1997 
Malik Miraj Khalid Ceased to be caretaker Prime Mininster after 
elections 
Feb 17, 1997 to 
Oct 12, 1999 
Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif Exiled to Saudi Arabia after Oct 12, 1999 
assumption of power by General Pervez Musharaf 
Oct 12, 1999 to 
Nov 23, 2002 
General Pervez Musharaf Relinquished office of chief executive 
Nov 23, 2002  
to Jun 26, 2004 
Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali Asked to relinquish the post to pave the way for 
Shaukat Aziz 
Jun 30, 2004  to 
Aug 26, 2004 
Chuadhary Shujaat Hussain 
 
Caretaker 
Aug 28, 2004  
to Nov 15, 2007 
Shaukat Aziz End of tenure for the preparation of general 
elections 
Nov 16, 2007  
to Mar 24, 2008 
Muhammad Mian Soomro Caretaker 
Mar 25, 2008 to 
date 
 
Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani 
 
Serving 
 
Source: Dates reproduced from Pakistan’s National Assembly Website [http://www.na.gov.pk] 
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